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I. Introduction 
To most observers the Asian currency crisis be-
gan in July 1997 with the devaluation of the Thai 
baht. It spread quickly through East Asia, al-
though with widely differing intensity and dura-
tion, and eventually affected the global economy, 
pushing several emerging countries into a deep 
recession. However, prior to this date, a number 
of the Asian economies had already begun to 
stagnate. As well, several countries experienced 
further currency crises into 1998 and suffered a 
decline during the summer of that year in corre-
spondence with the ruble crisis and huge capital 
flight out of most emerging markets. 
* We thank the editor, Albert Madansky, and two anony-
mous referees for many suggestions, which have substantially 
improved this paper. We are very grateful to Robert Dittmar for 
detailed comments and suggestions. We also acknowledge the 
comments of Viral Acharya, Edward Altman, Yakov Amihud, 
Tony Kao, Kanak Patel, Bertrand Renaud, Vijay Singal, and 
other participants in seminars at the 1999 AREA/AREUEA con-
ference in Maui, the 1999 NYU Conference on Risk and Re-
turn Management for Insurance Companies, the 2000 Indiana 
University Sixth Biennial Conference on Financial Crises, the 
2001 AFA Annual Meeting in New Orleans, and the 2002 EFMA 
Annual Meeting in London. Please address comments to the 
authors through email: jkallber@stern.nyu.edu, cliu@stern.nyu. 
edu, and ppasquar@bus.mich.edu, respectively. The usual dis-
claimer applies. 
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Many popular explanations for the Asian crisis emphasize the rela-
tionship between equity and currency markets in each country (see 
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1998 for an overview). A collapse in 
equity values led to an outflow of foreign investment, which exerted 
downward pressure on the domestic currency. From another perspec-
tive, currency devaluation, perhaps triggered by speculation, disrupted 
the domestic financial sector, then the entire domestic economy, finally 
bringing the equity market to a collapse. The magnitude of the losses in 
equity and currency markets during this period was in fact remarkable. 
Between June 1997 and September 1998, the Indonesian rupiah de-
preciated versus the U.S. dollar by 79%, while Indonesia’s equity index 
declined by 56%. The corresponding figures for Malaysia and the 
Philippines are 61% and 40%, and 67% and 34%, respectively (see Lin 
and Kuo 2000). 
One of the most significant questions raised by the events of 1997 
and 1998 is the extent to which the crisis was the result of natural 
dependencies rather than an example of an irrational or ‘‘herding’’ phe-
nomenon. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine how eq-
uity and currency markets reacted during this crisis. Many studies of 
financial crises focus on the correlations among countries’ equity and 
currency returns before and after a crisis. If the correlations are sig-
nificantly higher, a contagion effect is indicated, as in Bertero and 
Mayer (1990), and Lee and Kim (1993). But, as Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) point out, this approach is flawed, since the standard tests of 
increases in covariance are biased toward acceptance. Furthermore, 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (1999) show that, in foreign 
exchange markets, high volatilities are associated with high correla-
tions. A common empirical approach in the literature uses ARCH or 
GARCH specifications for volatility and return time series; for exam-
ple, see Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990) and Karolyi and Stulz (1996). 
These applications use high-frequency data to test for cointegration and 
typically focus on the transmission of volatility across markets. 
Our approach is different. We posit a simple, reduced-form structural 
relation between the equity and currency markets in each of six Asian 
countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Thailand. We select these countries for our study not only because 
all of them were financially integrated (to various degrees) by the early 
1990s and arguably experienced the greatest extent of financial, eco-
nomic, and political turmoil during 1997 and 1998, but also because 
each of them, prior to the crisis, maintained a pegged currency regime. 
More specifically, we estimate a linear relation between the equity re-
turns in a given country and leads and lags of the corresponding domes-
tic currency returns (relative to the U.S. dollar). We estimate a model 
for returns and volatility separately in each country. We then test for a 
regime shift in these relations. When a shift occurs, the nonparametric 
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technique we use, developed by Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1998), al-
lows us to determine confidence intervals around the break dates and 
perform statistical inference into the nature of the break with minimal 
restrictions on the underlying data generation process. 
Our data set comprises monthly return observations. The choice of 
lower-frequency data mitigates the potential impact of infrequent trad-
ing effects on the statistical inference, as suggested by Harvey (1995). 
If there is a regime break in our selected time frame, then we can as-
sume that a structural shift occurred between these markets. Analyzing 
the nature of this shift can help us understand its dynamics more pre-
cisely. For example, the shift could be the result of an adjustment in the 
means, a change in the lead-lag relation, or the like. If instead no shift 
occurred between 1997 and 1998, then we assume that the crisis event 
is a manifestation of natural dependencies across these markets. 
The patterns of potential regime breaks we observe during the Asian 
crisis allow us to address a second issue: Are these shocks consistent 
with the theoretical modeling of how various types of information 
events affect returns and volatility? The speculative trading model of 
Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek (1998) can be applied to portfolio allo-
cation in multiple foreign markets. Their study provides a framework 
for analyzing how structural breaks in a single market can spill over to 
others in two possible ways. First, a common information shock gen-
erates trading activity and volatility in each market simultaneously. 
Second, an information shock alters expectations in one market, result-
ing in investors adjusting their holdings in other markets. Portfolio 
rebalancing occurs because of the existence of correlations between 
returns, that is, because of the ensuing changes in hedging demand. 
Fleming et al. call the latter case ‘‘information spillover.’’ Therefore, 
our second goal includes testing whether the structural breaks occur 
simultaneously across all countries in our sample or in sequence. If all 
markets experience structural breaks simultaneously, then common 
information shocks predominate. If, instead, the timing of regime shifts 
differs across markets in various countries, then cross-country infor-
mation spillover effects are significant. 
A further aspect of this issue is to compare the timing of shocks to 
volatility and returns. It has long been argued in the financial literature 
that price and return volatility are related to the arrival of information. 
Merton (1980) develops a diffusion model showing that the variance of 
prices equals the rate ofinformation flow. Shalen (1993) proves that new 
information generates speculative trade because it modifies the disper-
sion of beliefs among traders.1 Under the assumption that information 
can arrive at different times to different types of traders, Hirshleifer, 
1. Shalen’s work is related to the volatility clustering models of Bollerslev, Chou, and 
Kroner (1992), among others. 
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Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) demonstrate that profit-taking be-
havior and herding should be more apparent in stocks that have more 
late-informed traders. If the spillover of information is not instanta-
neous, we test if shocks in volatility will affect future returns. This issue 
is part of the extensive literature dealing with return predictability. In a 
study of the U.S. stock market, French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) 
found evidence that a positive relation between expected equity vola-
tility and risk premiums leads to a negative relation between the unpre-
dicted component of volatility and excess returns. French et al. argue 
that, if risk premiums are positively related to the predicted component 
of market volatility, then a larger-than-predicted volatility will not only 
result in an upward revision of future volatility but increase the discount 
rate for future cash flows. The persistence of this shock in the predicted 
volatility depends on the particular return model adopted. The higher 
discount rate reduces the current stock price if cash flows do not adjust. 
Subsequent research (for example, Haugen, Talmor, and Torous 1991 or 
Brown, Harlow, and Tinic 1993) shows that future stock returns are 
positively correlated to current shifts in volatility. In our empirical set-
ting, we wish to determine whether or not information shocks lead to 
shifts in the structure of the volatility relation before or after they affect 
the return structure. Providing an answer to these questions is of interest 
not only to researchers aiming to understand how financial crises prop-
agate but also to policy makers and regulators hoping to predict and 
prevent future crises. 
We find that regime shifts in the hypothesized return and volatility 
relations did indeed occur in each of the six Asian countries in our data 
set over the interval 1994–98. The estimated regime shifts between 
equity and currency returns differ widely, both in timing and nature, 
from country to country. We show that shifts in volatility lead shifts in 
returns. While most regime shifts in returns take place almost a year 
after the currency crisis, many volatility breaks occur around the crisis 
period. The shocks in the return relations affect Malaysia and Thailand 
first, then the rest of Asia. Volatility breaks are instead concentrated in 
the fall of 1994 for Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand and in the last 
months of 1997 for the other countries in our sample. Our results also 
indicate that, after the estimated regime shifts occurred, most Asian 
equity markets became more responsive to the volatility of the corre-
sponding domestic exchange rate. The sequential nature of breaks in 
the structural relationship between currency and equity market returns 
and volatility in various Asian countries is consistent with information 
spillover effects. 
Such evidence suggests not only that breaks in volatility anticipated 
breaks in returns but also that volatility shocks in one country may have 
affected the posited relations between equity and currency markets in 
other countries during the crisis. To test for this possibility, we estimate 
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the impact of the break event in each country on the reduced-form 
volatility relation of other countries. If information spillover were at 
least partially responsible for the propagation of the event from one 
country to another, we would expect the statistical power of such struc-
tural relations to improve by including dummies for break dates in 
other countries. We find some evidence of information spillover across 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea between 1997 and 1998, 
when past regime shifts in the linear relation between their domestic 
equity and currency return volatility appear to have induced a statis-
tically and economically significant decline in equity returns. 
Finally, we attempt to link those estimated regime shifts to the 
movements of foreign capital using data on the flows of funds in each 
of the countries in this study. In particular, we seek to gain some insight 
into how the actions of international investors, specifically capital flight, 
influenced the structure of Asian currency and equity markets around 
the time of the crisis. To that purpose, we first test for whether the ob-
served sequence of structural breaks and the clustering in the estimated 
regime breaks can be explained by portfolio rebalancing or the ‘‘herd-
ing’’ behavior of foreign investors. We then develop a Poisson regression 
model to analyze whether changes in the flows of funds were responsible 
for the observed clustering in regime shifts. 
Our analysis provides further evidence that information spillover 
or herding effects generate the observed return and volatility shocks 
among countries. We show that portfolio rebalancing was a major chan-
nel for transmitting information shocks across markets during 1997 but 
not in 1998 (when the highest degree of herding occurred and most of 
the breaks in returns were instead observed). We also demonstrate that 
the expected number of return and return volatility break events per pe-
riod was greater, and the clustering of those break events more likely, 
when signed herding was more intense (i.e., when more equity markets 
were simultaneously experiencing withdrawals). 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II reviews the 
literature on the East Asian crisis that relates to our analysis. Section III 
illustrates the statistical methodology. Section IV describes the data sets 
and examines our first set of results. In section V, we study the rela-
tion between herding behavior and cross-country spillover. Section VI 
concludes. 
II. Explaining Financial Crises 
Financial crises have generated many economic explanations and mod-
els; Calomiris (1995) presents an overview. Several plausible reasons 
for the Asian crisis and its propagation across world economies have 
emerged. The disruptive actions of hedge funds, high volumes of for-
eign currency borrowing by Asian firms, mishandling by the IMF and 
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the Asian governments, and excessive risk-taking by banks and local 
entrepreneurs are among the most frequently cited. 
Many economists, such as Corsetti et al. (1998) and Allen and Gale 
(2000), have focused on the country ‘‘domino effect,’’ that is, the 
impact of the occurrence of a financial crisis in one country on other, 
not necessarily contiguous, markets. Others, like Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002), downplay the contagion story and attribute the outcomes of the 
crisis to existing intermarket correlations. For example, as real estate 
markets plummeted, banks suffered enormous losses due to their ex-
posure to real estate developers. These losses then spread to the rest of 
the financial sector (see Renaud 1997, 1999). 
Foreign exchange plays a central role in each of these possible ex-
planations. Hence, the Asian financial crisis is usually labeled a cur-
rency crisis, as in Park and Lee (2001). Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) 
argue that the currency crisis led to problems in the banking sector, as a 
response to deteriorating expectations about future economic activity. 
They document the extremely low returns to Asian banks between 
January 1997 and July 1998. High levels of dollar-denominated cor-
porate borrowing further magnified the crippling role of foreign ex-
change during the crisis, as emphasized by Thurow (1998).2 Currency 
crises are often modeled on the basis of restrictive assumptions about 
government strategies (for example, focusing on ‘‘unilateral pegs’’ and 
bilateral country structures). Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti (1998) analyze 
these flaws. One rationale underlying the currency and equity market 
contagion effect is that trade linkages provide a channel for the spread of 
financial problems, as in Glick and Rose (1999) and Dasgupta (2000). 
Crises, like bank runs, can also contain a self-fulfilling element. In 
this case, Obstfeld (1998) states that a sharp transition from equilibrium 
to a crisis state is more likely than a smooth decline of the domestic 
economy. Allen and Gale (2000) model this effect. Because liquid-
ity preference shocks are imperfectly correlated across geographical 
regions, banks hold interregional claims on other banks to provide in-
surance against these shocks. A small liquidity preference shock in 
one region can then spread throughout the economy. Allen and Gale 
find that the likelihood and intensity of contagion is highly dependent 
on the completeness of the market for interregional claims. Related to 
these models is the idea that the spread of financial crises is magnified 
because of incomplete information, as in Calvo and Mendoza (1997). 
Thus, a crisis in one country can signal information about the finan-
cial condition of other countries that share underlying regional factors 
and trade patterns. The widespread withdrawal of foreign funds, which 
2. Thurow (1998) observes that, by the end of 1997, most Korean private compa-
nies appeared to have borrowed some $160 billion in foreign currency, half in short-term 
loans. 
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creates pressure on the domestic currencies and interest rates, would 
then follow.3 
Research that examines the transmission of information shocks 
across markets is relevant to understanding financial crises. The most 
significant paper for our study is Fleming et al. (1998), who analyze 
volatility shocks across debt, equity, and money markets. Their work 
extends the single-asset, mean-variance model of Tauchen and Pitts 
(1983) to multiple markets and investigates empirically the effects of 
cross-market dependencies. As previously mentioned, Fleming et al.’s 
main goal was to investigate volatility linkages of two distinct types. In 
the first case, a common information shock affects traders’ expectations 
in each market simultaneously. Reacting to this shock, traders adjust 
their speculative demand across markets. In the second case (informa-
tion spillover), an information shock perturbs expectations in one mar-
ket, resulting in investors rebalancing their portfolios across other 
markets. With frictionless markets, the information spillover effect is 
complete and instantaneous. Under these circumstances, we could not 
distinguish empirically between shocks attributable to common infor-
mation and an information spillover effect. However, practical con-
siderations (e.g., market frictions) mitigate the intensity and speed of 
the information spillover effect and permit its empirical identification. 
Transaction costs and institutional constraints, such as position and 
capital limits, restrict the trading activity of portfolio managers for both 
speculative and hedging purposes. These factors further reduce inves-
tors’ ability to trade simultaneously in disparate markets. Differences in 
market depth may also reduce the speed with which an information 
shock spills over to other markets. 
In the next section, we model empirically the interaction among 
equity and currency markets as a (linear) structural relation between 
equity and currency returns and between their corresponding vola-
tilities. We then test whether a break occurred in any of these relations 
during the Asian crisis. The chronology of the estimated regime shifts 
will help us determine which kind of information shock affected the Far 
East markets in 1997 and 1998. 
III. Methodology: Testing for Regime Breaks 
In this section, we describe the empirical method we use to test for 
the existence of shocks in the structural relation between equity and 
currency returns and equity and currency volatility. By observing the 
3. In 1997, the prime minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, called hedge fund 
managers the ‘‘highwaymen’’ of the global economy. See Chancellor (2000). In Kallberg, 
Liu, and Pasquariello (2002), we explore in greater depth the role played by capital flight in 
the Asian crisis. 
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timing and the intensity of the breaks in the hypothesized structural 
relations between returns and volatilities, we can test several implica-
tions of the crisis models discussed in the previous section. Although 
the problem of detecting break dates in economic and financial time 
series has received increasing attention in the literature, formal mea-
sures of the precision of these estimates could not be obtained. The 
estimation of a confidence interval around the break date is important to 
economists because it incorporates a measure of sampling uncertainty 
in the analysis. 
In this paper, we adopt the statistical method of Bai, Lumsdaine, and 
Stock (1998), as it permits statistical inference about regime breaks, 
including interval estimation of the break date, with minimal restric-
tions on the underlying data generation process (DGP). In fact, Bai 
et al.’s nonparametric technique searches for a single break in uni-
variate or multivariate time series models (with or without stationary 
regressors) assuming only that the DGP is a stationary vector auto-
regression (VAR) before and after the break and specifies asymptotic 
confidence intervals for the estimated break point. 
We use this approach to test for regime shifts in the hypothesized 
linear relation between equity and currency returns and equity and 
currency return volatility for each country. We start by applying the 
technique to a reduced-form model for returns. The model uses month t 
equity index returns denominated in local currency as the dependent 
variable. The independent variables are the currency returns in each of 
the five months t — 2 to t + 2 (to account for possible lead-lag rela-
tions) and the equity return in month t — 1 (to account for first-order 
autocorrelation in returns). We perform a similar analysis on monthly 
volatility, estimated using a 12-month rolling window. We have the 
following equation: 
yt = [i + Ayt~1 + y btxt+i-3 + dt{k) X + a^_1+ fitxt +i-3 + et, 
with dtðkÞ equal to 1 if t is greater than or equal to k, and zero otherwise.7 
Here, k is a potential break date, yt is the equity index return for a 
certain country in month t, and xt is the corresponding currency return 
4. See, for example, Perron (1989) and Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1992). 
5. This technique was first applied by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002a) to date 
the integration of world financial markets. 
6. Officer (1973) and Merton (1980) were the first to use a rolling 12-month standard 
deviation. Our results are not sensitive to the particular averaging interval. 
7. It is important to observe that the preceding lead-lag specification does not necessarily 
imply a causal relation from the market for the domestic currency to the local equity market, 
or vice versa, in a country. Indeed, eq. (1) also allows for the possibility that one market 
reacts to a common information shock faster than the other. 
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in month t. If we define S as a binary selection matrix with diagonal 
elements of ones corresponding to the parameters of eq. (1) that are 
allowed to change, we can write eq. (1) in a stacked form: 
yt = Vt $ + dt(k)VtS Sb + et, (2) 
with Vt = (1,yt-1,xt-2, . . . ixt+2), "$ = {V",A,b1,... ,b5), and 6 = (\, a. 
31,..., (35). In matrix form this is equivalent to 
yt = Zt (k)B + et, (3) 
where Zt{k) = \Vt ,dt(k)VtS 1 and B = (rfl,56). 
The model allows a wide range of assumptions about parameter 
shifts. The model is one of a full structural change if all (R) coeffi-
cients are allowed to change. Then, S = IR. If we instead assume that 
only a subset of the coefficients undergoes a regime shift, then a par-
tial structural model is more appropriate. For example, if we suspect a 
break only in the intercept, then we assume that only S(1, 1) = 1. As 
reported in Bai et al. (1998), tests for partial structural changes tend to 
have more power than those for full structural changes. However, our 
analysis indicates that the breaks are statistically significant when we 
use a full structural model rather than simply allowing the intercept to 
break. A variety of tests for a break based on Wald statistics have been 
proposed in the literature. For a null hypothesis that Sb = 0, for k = 
k1* + 1 , . . . , T — k2f, where k* and k{' are some trimming values, Bai 
et al.’s test, which is similar to that of Quandt (1958, 1960), considers 
the maximum of the following F process: 
F(k) = T{RB(k)}'lRT-1J2zt(k)ˆ ^z't(k) ) R \ {RB(k)}, (4) 
where R = [0, S] is such that RB = Sb, and B(k) and 2^ are the estimators 
for B and the residual variance <r£2, respectively, evaluated under the alter-
native hypothesis, that is, given k. The estimated break date is then k, the 
value that maximizes F(k) and is statistically significant if F(ˆ) is greater 
than the corresponding critical value (for the selected significance level). 
8. Trimming is necessary for the model of eq. (1) to be full rank before and after any 
possible break date k. Because of the lead-and-lag structure of eq. (1) and the definition of 
dt(k), the trimming values used in our analysis are k1* = 10 and k2 = 9. 
9. To compute critical values for the max F(k), Bai et al. (1998) suggest approximating 
the limiting distribution of the F process with partial sums of normal random variables for 
each possible dimension of the test statistic F(k), that is, for the rank of the selected vector S. 
Bekaert et al. (2002a) report one such table with critical values for dimensions up to 68, 
which we use for this research. 
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When we analyze a time series, if there is in fact a break, then the 
problem of constructing confidence intervals for the true break dates is 
not trivial. Various authors have examined this problem under the as-
sumption of independently and identically distributed Gaussian errors. 
Bai et al. (1998) instead assume that the disturbances form a sequence 
of martingale differences with some moment conditions and use limit 
theorems to construct asymptotic confidence intervals for the true break 
date, with coverage of at least 100(1 — TX)%, of the following form: 
-1 
(5) 
where k and 2^ are the estimated values for the break date and ae2, re-
spectively, and ci/2lt is the 100(1 — ir/2)th quantile of the Picard (1985) 
distribution for IT = 0:05. Next, we describe statistically the two re-
gimes identified by the structural break in the return time series. More 
specifically, we estimate the hypothesized model assuming that k is in 
fact the true break date; that is, we estimate the parameters of the fol-
lowing regression model: 
yt = Zt (k) B + et: (6) 
Equation (6) allows us to examine the effects of the identified structural 
break, if any, over the parameters of the structural relations between 
equity and currency returns. 
We then focus on the second moments of returns, by extending the 
basic model of eq. (1) to the case of equity and currency volatility. 
More precisely, we search for breaks in a structural relation between 
monthly rolled volatility for the available series of equity returns and 
the corresponding monthly rolled volatility series for currency returns. 
We calculate the rolled volatility as a moving standard deviation of 
10. For a review of the available literature on the topic, see Bai et al. (1998). 
11. Bai et al. (1998) investigate some of the finite sample properties of these test statistics. 
Using Monte Carlo simulations on I(0) and I(1) models, they show that the tests perform 
adequately, in terms of size and power, under the null hypothesis of no break and under the 
alternative hypothesis of a break in the mean of the DGP. Bai et al. also observe that, for a 
fixed break magnitude, the confidence interval does not depend on the sample size and, in 
particular, does not shrink for bigger sample sizes. Nonetheless, their results suggest that the 
asymptotic confidence intervals tend to be too tight and the performance of all the univariate 
intervals improves substantially when T is increased. Further exploration of such issues for 
more general structural break specifications, available in Bekaert et al. (2002a), confirms that 
the size properties of the Wald test statistics are satisfactory in univariate models regardless 
of whether exogenous regressors are included in the analysis. 
k±c1 
2 
(Sb)S t?T~1 J2vtv;s'(sˆ) 
t=1 
An Examination of the Asian Crisis 179 
12 monthly returns for the equity (oy) and currency (ax) index returns. 
The proposed model is now 
Qyt = V" + Aayt-1 + baxt + (/((A:) [\ + (3CTXJ + £(. (7) 
Finally, as for returns in eq. (6), we estimate eq. (7) for each country at the 
measured break date to examine the effects of the regime shift over such 
reduced-form relation for volatility. 
As previously mentioned, many studies in the growing literature on 
financial crises use ARCH and GARCH models to analyze the behav-
ior of volatility through time. GARCH models are especially attractive 
because of their ability to capture the time-varying nature of volatility 
with a limited number of coefficients. However, this approach is much 
less successful in capturing regime shifts in economic time series due to 
low-probability events, such as financial crises (see Susmel 2000 for a 
review). To overcome this shortcoming, Hamilton and Susmel (1994) 
extended ARCH specifications to account explicitly for potential struc-
tural changes in the underlying DGP. Edwards and Susmel (2000, 2001) 
use a variant of this methodology, known as SWARCH, to test whether 
higher-volatility regimes and increased codependence of those volatil-
ity regimes across countries characterize weekly interest rate and equity 
time series for a sample of Asian and Latin American markets. Their re-
sults indicate that volatility comovements are more likely among stock 
markets than among money markets. The SWARCH setting, however, 
is highly parametric, for it requires conditional normality of residuals 
and the formulation of a specific probability law (e.g., a Markov chain), 
causing the economy to switch regimes. Inference therefore becomes 
more problematic, since tests of the null hypothesis of no breaks are 
simultaneously tests of the validity of these assumptions. The technique 
of Bai et al. (1998), employed in this paper, allows us to test whether 
a reduced-form relation between equity and currency return volatility 
underwent a statistically significant break over the selected interval 
while, at the same time, imposing the simplest structure possible on the 
DGP. 
One of the main goals of this paper is to test whether the events of 1997 
and 1998 affected the interaction between equity and currency markets. 
The specifications selected to that purpose in eqq. (1) and (7) result from a 
balance between the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, 
12. For this case, the trimming values we adopted are k1* = 5 and k2 = 4. 
13. Note that, by construction, the rolled volatility series has positive serial correlation. 
We take this into account by including a lagged term in the regression model. However, 
since the focus of our analysis is on breaks in the relation between markets and most of the 
series’ persistence is induced by the way it is computed, we do not allow the serial corre-
lation coefficient to vary in eq. (7). Allowing the persistence term to vary after date k results 
in mostly insignificant postbreak coefficient changes and does not affect the inference based 
on the reported Wald statistics. 
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economic rationale, and data availability constraints. Nevertheless, as em-
phasized by Rigobon (2001), stock market returns and exchange rate data, 
especially at high frequencies, appear to be ‘‘plagued with simultaneous 
equations, omitted variables, conditional and unconditional heteroske-
dasticity, serial correlation, non-linearity and non-normality problems.’’ 
However, autocorrelations in our data set of equity and currency return 
series (not reported here) are either small or not statistically significant at 
the monthly frequency we use in the analysis. Moreover, the nonpara-
metric technique devised by Bai et al. has the attractive feature of not 
requiring normality in the residuals from eqq. (1) and (7). 
Albeit with these caveats, testing for the existence and timing of vol-
atility and return shocks, that is, for breaks in the posited linear rela-
tions, can help us shed some light on whether events observed in Asia 
in 1997 and 1998 are attributable to either common information shocks 
or information spillover from one country to another. If common in-
formation shocks are associated with the Asian crisis, then we should 
see concurrent regime shifts in volatility and returns across countries. 
On the other hand, if the timing of these regime shifts differs across coun-
tries, then we can attribute this to information spillover effects. 
IV. Empirical Results 
A. Data 
We use monthly time series of currency and equity returns in our anal-
ysis of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. We assume that the exchange rate of each local currency 
relative to the dollar is the key exchange rate variable. Therefore, the 
monthly currency returns are the spot rates that correspond to the noon 
buying rate for cable transfers payable in foreign currencies, as re-
corded by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York every business day. 
For each of the six markets, we use the major equity index in local 
currency to calculate a monthly time series of local returns: JCI Jakarta 
Composite Index, EMAS Equity Index, PSE Index, Kospi 200, the 
Thailand Stock Exchange Index, and the TWSE Stock Index. Monthly 
equity indexes for each country are from Bloomberg. 
A variety of reasons justify the composition of our data set. First, 
according to Bekaert et al. (2002a), the capital markets of the selected 
countries had already moved from financially segmented to integrated 
regimes by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, ear-
lier than our sample periods.14 Therefore, if no statistically significant 
14. This is true regardless of whether the date of each country’s integration with world 
markets in Bekaert et al. (2002a) is measured using endogenously estimated dates or dates of 
official capital market reforms (official liberalization dates, introduction of ADRs, intro-
duction of country funds). 
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regime break can be found between 1997 and 1998, we can interpret 
the events accompanying the Asian crisis as manifestations of natu-
ral dependencies across those markets, consistent with the regimes 
induced by the earlier process of economic and financial integration. 
Second, these countries arguably suffered the greatest degree of eco-
nomic, financial, and political turmoil during 1997 and 1998. A brief 
chronology of the crisis is reported in table 1. These economies, ex-
cept Taiwan, were explicitly entitled by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) to access emergency funding facilities made available by Japan 
in the fall of 1998 (the ‘‘New Miyazawa Initiative’’) in recognition 
of the severe impact of the currency crisis on their economic and fi-
nancial systems.15 Third, all those countries were unilaterally pegged 
to the U.S. dollar by relatively tight bands of fluctuation around the 
time of the Asian crisis.16 Thailand abandoned its fixed exchange rate 
regime on July 2, 1997. Indonesia gave up its enlarged currency band 
on August 14, 1997. The Indonesian rupiah crashed soon afterward. 
South Korea renounced battling the increasing selling pressure on 
the won in November 1997, and so did Malaysia. The Philippines 
and Taiwan were also hit by the crisis, although less severely. In the 
Philippines, the central bank was forced to relax its previously suc-
cessful band of fluctuations for the peso by the end of July 1997. 
Taiwan at first was able to fend off expectations of increased depreci-
ation through its central bank’s policy of active foreign exchange in-
tervention. Therefore, the country initially appeared unaffected by the 
economic instability undermining the rest of the region. However, on 
October 17, 1997, Taiwan decided to adopt a floating exchange rate 
regime, and the new Taiwan dollar subsequently fell by 30% versus the 
U.S. dollar. 
Many analysts and economists seem to agree that Taiwan’s economy 
paid a very high price for the comparative resilience shown throughout 
1997 and 1998, in particular in the domestic financial markets, where the 
steep rise of short-term interest rates and the loss of foreign reserves 
were accompanied by a severe (albeit lagging) decline of the stock mar-
ket. Indeed, while many other Asian equity markets were plummeting, 
the TWSE Stock Index instead rose by 13.15% in 1997, before even-
tually falling by more than 21% in 1998. Investigating the potential role 
of portfolio rebalancing in explaining these disparities and the occur-
rence of potential ‘‘information spillover’’ events from one market to 
another is an objective of this research. 
15. The international political isolation of Taiwan from the rest of Asia may explain its 
exclusion from the ‘‘New Miyazawa Initiative’’. 
16. Grier and Grier (2001) find that currency depreciation and equity price declines were 
more pronounced than what could have been justified by existing macroeconomic funda-
mentals in developing countries that started 1997 with an exchange rate peg. 
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TABLE 1 A Chronology of the Asian Crisis, 1997–99 
Date Event 
May 1997 
July 2, 1997 
End of July 1997 
August 14, 1997 
Fall 1997 (1) 
Fall 1997 (2) 
October 17, 1997 
October 20, 1997 
October 20, 1997 
October 24, 1997 
October 27, 1997 
November 1997 
November 17, 1997 
November 18, 1997 
November 22, 1997 
December 1997 
December 4, 1997 
July 6, 1998 
July 20, 1998 
August 17, 1998 
September 1, 1998 
September 2, 1998 
September 23, 1998 
October 15, 1998 
Fall 1998 
January 10, 1999 
January 13, 1999 
The Thai baht comes under strong depreciation pressure 
Devaluation of the Thai baht 
The Philippines central bank relaxes its fluctuation band 
for the peso 
Indonesia abandons the rupiah trading band 
The IMF offers U.S. $1 billion to the Philippines to 
rescue the peso 
An aid fund of U.S. $16 billion is granted by the IMF 
to Thailand 
Taiwan’s central bank adopts a clean floating foreign 
exchange regime 
The Hong Kong dollar (HKD) falls victim to speculation 
The Taiwanese dollar (NTD) depreciates by 5% against 
the U.S. dollar 
The overnight interest rate 
in Hong Kong soars from 5% to 300% 
The Hang Seng index plunges; panic selling in New York 
and Europe 
Indonesia is granted U.S. $23 billion by the IMF 
South Korea abandons its defense of the won 
U.S. and Japan meet with Southeast Asian countries 
in Manila 
Korean government formally asks the IMF for bail out 
IMF launches the biggest international aid plan in history 
for Korea 
Markets question the plan; the won falls to nearly 2000 
for a U.S. dollar dollar 
Salomon Brothers dismantles its bond arbitrage desk 
First Wall Street Journal headlines on LTCM losses 
Russian effective default and ruble devaluation 
Malaysia introduces capital controls 
LTCM shareholder letter, announcing the fund’s collapse, 
is issued 
LTCM recapitalization 
Intermeeting Federal Reserve rate cut 
Japan launches the ‘‘Miyazawa Initiative’’ to rescue 
East Asian countries 
China refuses to help foreign creditors of GITIC; 
markets disrupted 
Fears of debt crisis in China sweep through Hong Kong; 
Brazil devalues the real 
Note.—This table, from the authors, Bank for International Settlements (1999). and Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, (2000), reports selected significant economic, political, and financial events that occurred 
between 1997 and the first three months of 1999. 
As mentioned earlier, the choice of monthly data is also not casual 
and is consistent with previous applications of the technique used in 
this paper to detect the occurrence of structural breaks in economic and 
financial time series (e.g., Bai et al. 1998 and, more recently, Bekaert 
et al. 2002a, 2002b). Employing weekly or even daily equity and 
currency data for the identification of structural breaks in fact raises 
concerns related to the possibility of biases induced by infrequent or 
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nonsynchronous trading. Although the trading activity of many of the 
emerging markets is surprisingly intense, Harvey (1995) suggests that 
it might be appropriate to use monthly rather than weekly time series to 
mitigate the possible influences of these biases and short-term noise on 
the resulting statistical inference. Furthermore, as reported by Bai et al. 
(1998) (and summarized in note 11 of Section III), Monte Carlo anal-
ysis of the finite sample performance of the proposed estimator for k 
reveals little or no change in the estimated confidence intervals for in-
creased frequency and constant sample length T; substantial improve-
ments in the precision in the estimated break date appear to be obtained 
only for constant frequency and increased T. 
B. Basic Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for each country. Sample periods 
are of different length, due to data availability constraints, but they all 
end in March 1999. Mean returns and sample volatilities reveal a wide 
disparity across the region. Mean monthly equity returns are negative 
in the Philippines (—0.29%) and Thailand (—0.67%). Table 2 also 
reports (not surprisingly) negative returns on currencies over this pe-
riod. Correlation matrices for currency and equity returns and their 
corresponding volatility time series (not reported here) characterize the 
interaction among the six countries we consider. 
The correlations for equity returns are mostly positive, ranging be-
tween 0.306 and 0.691. The currency return correlations are similar, 
although somewhat lower than those obtained for equity index returns. 
These facts seem to indicate that the markets and the asset classes in our 
study are only moderately correlated. Hence, there appear to be ex-
ante hedging and portfolio rebalancing opportunities for fund managers 
investing in the region. 
Volatility correlations across the six countries tend to be much more 
significant (and higher) than the return correlations, ranging from 0.507 
to 0.969. We also observe a very wide dispersion of values, which sug-
gests that the lead-lag relations among these countries are complex. 
Correlations between equity and currency returns are all quite low, 
from a minimum of —0.206 to a maximum of 0.408. This confirms our 
previous observation that diversification effects should be strong and 
the existence of common factors in these returns is not apparent. As 
before, correlations between equity and currency volatility show higher 
values than those between the corresponding return time series. Most 
of the countries have volatility correlations higher than 0.636. 
17. This conclusion is even stronger if we take into account that those matrices are 
affected by the increase in correlation that followed the events of 1997 and 1998. For an 
analysis of the behavior of correlations in Asia before and after 1997, see Baig and Goldfajn 
(1998). 
TABLE 2 
Countries 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Descriptive Statistics 
Equity Returns 
Mean 
.06% 
.19% 
- .29% 
.21% 
1.02% 
— .67% 
Std Dev 
11.88% 
10.19% 
10.06% 
10.52% 
9.38% 
11.84% 
Currency 
Mean 
-5 .56% 
- .62% 
- . 9 1 % 
- . 5 5 % 
- .34% 
- .62% 
Returns 
Std Dev 
25.05% 
3.40% 
3.77% 
5.01% 
1.99% 
5.23% 
Flows of Funds 
Mean 
60.67 
86.52 
154.15 
229.77 
100.78 
64.55 
Std Dev 
146.88 
648.09 
184.61 
445.79 
335.04 
432.00 
Sample Size 
Jan 96–Mar 99 
Nov 92–Mar 99 
Nov 94–Mar 99 
Jan 90–Mar 99 
Apr 93–Mar 99 
Mar 93–Mar 99 
Note.—This table displays descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for time series of local equity indexes and currency returns and flows of funds for each of the 
countries included in the study. Equity returns in local currency are computed from local equity indexes’ monthly time series obtained from Bloomberg. Currency returns are 
calculated from the exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar. The minus sign represents devaluation of the local currency. Currency data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York. Flows of funds are in millions of U.S. dollars and calculated as the difference between the total foreign purchases and sales of domestic stocks in each month of the sample. 
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TABLE 3 
Country 
Analysis of Structural Breaks 
2.5th Percentile Median 97.5th Percentile Max Wald p-Value 
A. Analysis of Equity Indexes Monthly Returns 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
May 1998 
Oct 1997 
Feb 1998 
Dec 1997 
Jan 1994 
Jan 1998 
B. Analysis of 
May 1997 
Jun 1994 
Jul 1998 
Sep 1997 
Sep 1994 
Sep 1994 
a 
Jun 1998 
Feb 1998 
Apr 1998 
Mar 1998 
Feb 1994 
Mar 1998b 
Equity Indexes 
c 
Jun 1997 
Oct 1994 
Aug 1998 
Nov 1997 
Oct 1994 
Oct 1994 
Jun 1998 
May 1998 
May 1998 
May 1998 
Feb 1994 
Apr 1998 
24.19 
35.64 
47.33 
26.52 
23.93 
27.45 
Monthly Return Volatility 
Jun 1997 
Jan 1995 
Aug 1998 
Dec 1997 
Oct 1994 
Oct 1994 
70.70 
23.56 
63.61 
17.67 
32.55 
21.22 
<.05 
<.01 
<.01 
<.05 
<.05 
<.01 
<.01 
<.01 
<.01 
<.01 
<.01 
<.01 
ˆ Note.—This table reports estimated break dates k for the structural relation between equity and 
currency returns ( panel A): 
= \i + Ayt-1 + 2_^ ^;xri-3 + dt(k) X + ayf_1 + ^ f t x t+i-3 
and between equity and currency return volatility (panel B): 
Qyt = l-L + Ao-yt-1 + boxt + dt (k) [ \ + fiOxt] + St • (7) 
respectively. The Median column shows the estimated break date k, computed using the Wald statis-
tic F described in eq. (4). For both eqq. (1) and (7), we test the null hypothesis that the postbreak 
coefficient changes are not significantly different from zero, that is, no break occurred in the sample 
period, by comparing the maximum value in the estimated time series F(k) to the 5% quantile of its 
limiting distribution. The null hypothesis is rejected when the maximum value for.F(A;), reported in the 
Max Wald column, is lower than the critical value for the selected significance level. Bekaert et al. 
(2002a) compute a table with critical values for max F(k) (for dimensions up to 68), approximating the 
limiting distribution of the F process with partial sums of normal random variables for each possible 
dimension of the test statistic F(k). From such table, we use the asymptotic 1% (5%) critical value of 
27.02 (22.21) for eq. (1) (where seven parameters are allowed to break) and of 16.37 for eq. (7) (where 
two parameters are allowed to break). The 2.5th and 97.5th Percentile columns display estimated lower 
and upper bands, respectively, for the confidence intervals for the ‘‘true’’ break dates, computed with 
quantiles of the Picard (1985) distribution. 
a 
Significant at the 5% level (for a critical value of 22.21). 
Significant at the 1% level (for a critical value of 27.02) or less. 
c Significant at the 1% level (for a critical value of 16.37) or less. 
C. Analyzing Regime Shifts 
We start by testing for breaks in the assumed structural relationships 
between local equity returns and local currency returns (table 3, panel A) 
and between the volatility of local equity returns and the volatility of 
local currency returns (table 3, panel B). As an example of the analysis 
underlying table 3, we report in figure 1 the time series of equity and 
currency indexes (figure 1a), their rolled volatility series (figure 1b), 
and the corresponding Wald statistics (figures 1c and 1d), computed 
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Fig. 1.—Search for a break in the structural relations between equity and currency returns and return volatility: Thailand. Figure 1a displays 
the monthly time series for the Thailand Stock Exchange Index (on the left axis) and a $/ baht currency index (on the right axis) constructed 
with January 1971 as base date (100). Lower values of the currency index represent a weaker baht relative to the U.S. dollar. Figure 1b shows 
the time series of rolled volatility for both equity and currency returns. Rolled volatility is computed from monthly return time series using a 
12-month rolling window. Figures 1c and 1d report (on the left axis) the monthly time series of the Wald statistic F(k) to test for a break in the 
structural relation between equity and currency returns (eq. [1]) and equity and currency volatility (eq. [7]), respectively. The 5% confidence 
ˆ ˆ intervals ( plotted at the 5% significance level for the Wald statistic) around the date k that maximizes FðkÞ over the sample interval are 
computed according to eq. (5). 
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according to eq. (4) in section III, for Thailand. Figures 2 and 3 display 
the confidence intervals at the 5% level around those estimated break 
ˆ dates k, ranked in order of increasing statistical significance, over two 
time intervals: March–December 1997 and January–October 1998. 
These two intervals correspond to most of the observed break dates for 
equity versus currency returns (figures 2a and 3a) and equity versus 
currency return volatility figures 2b and 3b. 
Table 3 (and figures 2 and 3) contain the main features of our anal-
ysis of regime shifts in returns and return volatility. The table re-
ports the median break point date and its associated significance. For 
the relations between equity and currency return in table 3, panel A, we 
find that all the countries in our sample experience a statistically sig-
nificant regime shift (at the 5% level). More important, all the shifts 
(except Taiwan) occur from February to June 1998. The shocks ap-
pear to affect Malaysia and South Korea first, then quickly move to the 
other countries. For example, the shift in the parameters of eq. (1) for 
Thailand is statistically significant in March 1998, in the aftermath of 
the devaluation of the baht but before the Russian default (see table 1). 
Our results also offer some support to the notion (supported, among 
others, by Wu 1998) that financial instability in Taiwan during the 
Asian crisis was less acute than in the rest of the region. 
The picture offered by the analysis of the relation between equity 
and currency return volatility in table 3, panel B is very different. The 
estimated regime shifts are more dispersed in time than in the case 
of returns. Structural breaks in eq. (7) affect Malaysia, Taiwan, and 
Thailand in October 1994. Around the time of the currency crisis, 
regime shifts involve Indonesia and South Korea. Finally, in August 
1998, the Philippines undergoes a switch. 
An analysis of the pre- and postbreak regressions, given in tables 4 
and 5, illuminates the nature of these regime shifts and of the lead-lag 
relations in these countries. To correct for heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation in the residuals of regressions (1) and (7), the statistical 
significance of the coefficients is measured using Newey-West standard 
errors. As discussed in Section II, the postbreak coefficients represent 
incremental changes in the prebreak coefficients. Table 4 refers to the 
regime shift analysis for volatility reported in table 3, panel B. The 
posited structural relations fit the data relatively well: adjusted R2 
values range from 83% (Taiwan) to 97% (Malaysia). The most com-
plete regime shift seems to have occurred in Malaysia, Taiwan, and 
Thailand, where both the intercept term (m) and the coefficient for the 
contemporaneous relationship between equity and currency return vol-
atility (A) in eq. (7) experience a statistically significant change. 
The most startling result from Table 4 is the uniformity across coun-
tries in the sign of b, the change in the contemporaneous linear relation 
between equity and currency return volatility after a break occurred. 
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Fig. 2.—Flows of funds, return, and volatility breaks in East Asia: March 1997– 
January 1998. Figures 2a and 2b display confidence intervals at the 5% significance 
ˆ level around the estimated break date k, that is, the one that maximizes the Wald 
statistic Fˆ  ðkÞ over the sample interval, for the structural relations between equity 
and currency return and volatility, respectively. The confidence intervals are com-
puted according to Bai et al. (1998). The confidence interval measure of 6 (left axis) 
ˆ ˆ is associated with the country for which we measure the most significant FðkÞ in 
the sample. The confidence interval measure of 1 (left axis) is associated with the 
ˆ ˆ country for which we measure the least significant FðkÞ in the sample. Figure 2c 
reports monthly flows of funds data for the six countries in our sample: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Flows of funds 
are in millions of U.S. dollars and are calculated as the difference between the total 
foreign purchases and sales of domestic stocks in each month of the sample. 
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Fig. 3.—Flows of funds, return, and volatility breaks in East Asia: April– 
December 1998. Figures 3a and 3b display confidence intervals at the 5% signif-
ˆ 
icance level around the estimated break date k, that is, the one that maximizes the 
Wald statistic Fˆ  ðkÞ over the sample interval, for the structural relations between 
equity and currency return and volatility, respectively. The confidence intervals 
are computed according to Bai et al. (1998). The confidence interval measure of 
6 (left axis) is associated with the country for which we measure the most signif-
ˆ ˆ 
icant FðkÞ in the sample. The confidence interval measure of 1 (left axis) is asso-
ciated with the country for which we measure the least significant Fˆ  ðkˆÞ in the sample. 
Figure 3c reports monthly flows of funds data for the six countries in our sample: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Flows of 
funds are in millions of U.S. dollars and are calculated as the difference between the 
total foreign purchases and sales of domestic stocks in each month of the sample. 
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TABLE 4 
Country 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Break in the Structural Relation between 
Return Volatility 
R2 
92.39% 
96.73% 
93.60% 
94.34% 
82.86% 
95.27% 
Prebreak Coefficients 
Intercept 
.076 
.016 
.017 
.022 
- .056 b 
X 
- 8 . 3 7 1 b 
.817 
.204 
-.006 
-1.503 
-2.012 a 
Y - 1 
.627 
.735 
.721 
.685 
.724 
.650 
Equity and Currency 
Postbreak Coefficients 
D Intercept 
- . 0 3 1 b 
-.009 
-.003 
.005 
- .037 b 
- .034 b 
DX 
8 4 0 2 b 
- .220 b 
.403 
.309 
1.680 
2.393 
ˆ Note.—This table displays regression coefficients estimated at the break date k for the structural 
relation between equity and currency return volatility 
o-yt = \i-\- Ao-yt-1 + boxt + dt(k) [X + fioxt] + £t • (7) 
The first column of the table reports the corresponding adjusted regression R2; R2a, for each of the 
countries in the sample. The three prebreak coefficient columns display the estimated coefficients in the 
ˆ hypothesized structural relationship before the break occurred. We identify the break dates k through 
the Wald Statistic described in eq. (4). Break dates for each of the countries in our sample are collected 
in table 3, panel B. The two postbreak coefficient columns show the change (D) in the structural co-
efficients after the break occurred. To correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals 
of this regression, statistical significance of the coefficients is measured using Newey-West standard 
errors. 
a
 Significant at the 10% level. 
b
 Significant at the 5% level or less. 
Most of the coefficient changes are positive, and many of them are 
statistically significant. This indicates that, following the estimated re-
gime shifts, equity markets tend to become more responsive to the 
volatility in the corresponding domestic exchange rate. However, be-
cause the breaks occur quite late in our sample period, only few of the 
coefficients are statistically significant. In table 5, which reports pa-
rameter estimates for shifts in the return relations, we observe less 
pronounced structural shifts than the ones recorded for the volatility 
relations. The adjusted R2 values now range from 37% (for Taiwan) to 
63% (Philippines), with a much lower average. Again, since many of 
the regime breaks in returns take place by the end of our sample period 
(but also because of the presence of multicollinearity), some of the 
individual coefficients’ changes have weak statistical significance and 
do not suggest any consistent interpretation.18 
18. This issue arises because, when the Wald statistic identifies a break late in the sample 
period, there are fewer observations with which to estimate the seven postshift coefficient 
changes in eq. (1). Indeed, in our analysis, the breaks in the hypothesized structural relation 
between equity and currency returns occur in the first few months of 1998 for five of the 
six countries in the sample. The problem is somewhat less serious in the case of eq. (7), where 
there are just two postbreak parameters to estimate. In addition, multicollinearity affecting the 
many explanatory variables in eq. (1) might also obscure their individual contribution to the fit. 
In short, the resulting postshift estimates for the parameters in eq. (1) may be statistically and 
economically insignificant, even if the joint effect of the break dummies is significant. There-
fore, these coefficients are not reported in table 5 but are available from the authors on request. 
T A B L E 5 B r e a k in the S t r u c t u r a l Re la t ion be tween E q u i t y a n d C u r r e n c y R e t u r n s 
Country Ri Intercept x Y-\ X-\ X— 2 X + 1 X + 2 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
41.88% 
42.57% 
62.66% 
44.79% 
26.72% 
29.58% 
.002 
.013 
.009 
.001 
.207 
.003 
- .094 b 
-.701 
-.166 
.632 
7.580 
—.517 
-.136 
-.055 
.037 
- .067 
- .296 b 
-.084 
.014 
1.128 
b 
.756 
"•991 
2.899 
.289 
-.135 
.514 
-.984 
- .217 
13.159 
—.211 
.129 
b 
.639, 
1.043 
b 
.354 
b l l . 0 8 9 
b 
.742 
.140 
.313 
.240 
.410 
16.505u 
.359 b 
b 
ˆ Note.—This table displays regression coefficients estimated at the break date k for the structural relation between equity and currency returns 
yt = |-L + Ayt—i -\- bfXti—3 -\- dAkj X + ay t_i + ^ ( 3 » (!) 
The first column of the table reports the corresponding regression adjusted R2; R2a, for each of the countries in the sample. The columns display the estimated prebreak coefficients 
in the hypothesized structural relationship before the break occurred. The postbreak coefficients are not reported but are available from the authors on request. We identify the 
ˆ break dates k through the Wald statistic described in eq. (4). Break dates for each of the countries in our sample are collected in table 3, panel A. Because the breaks in the 
hypothesized structural relation between equity and currency returns occur late in the sample for five of the six countries in the sample and the interaction among the explanatory 
variables may obscure their individual contributions to the fit even if their joint effect is significant, several of the resulting postshift estimates for the parameters in eq. (1) are 
either statistically or economically insignificant. Hence, those estimates are not reported here but are available from the authors on request. To correct for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the residuals of this regression, the statistical significance of the coefficients is measured using Newey-West standard errors. 
a
 Significant at the 10% level. 
b
 Significant at the 5% level or less. 
b 
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In short, tables 3–5 reveal that, for three of the countries in our 
sample (Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea, where the great-
est extent of political turmoil ensued from the Asian crisis, the domes-
tic central banks strictly controlled the corresponding currencies, and 
market regulations were poor or nonexistent), breaks in the reduced-
form relations described in eqq. (1) and (7) do occur in 1997 and 1998 
for both returns and return volatility. Regime shifts in the lead-lag rela-
tion between equity and currency returns were registered for Malaysia, 
Taiwan, and Thailand as well. Nonetheless, for those three countries, 
breaks in return volatility cluster by the end of 1994, before the Mexican 
peso crisis. This evidence suggests that the increase in the volatility 
of stock and currency returns observed in these economies during the 
Asian turmoil was a manifestation of natural dependencies among the 
domestic equity and exchange rate markets rather than the result of a 
sequence of regime shifts in their interaction. 
Furthermore, breaks in the hypothesized structural relations between 
equity and currency return volatility appear to consistently anticipate 
the corresponding break events in the returns’ relations for most of the 
countries in our sample, even after accounting for the width of the con-
ˆ fidence intervals around the estimated dates k in table 3. For instance, in 
Indonesia, the reduced-form linear relation between the volatility of 
the domestic stock market and the volatility of the corresponding ex-
change rate breaks in a statistically significant fashion in June 1997, 
ahead of the devaluation of the Thai baht and a full month before the 
local central bank eventually abandoned the rupiah trading band (as 
reported in table 1). Nonetheless, the relation between the correspond-
ing equity and currency returns does not shift until June 1998, in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis and before the Russian default and the 
subsequent collapse of long-term capital management (LTCM). This 
evidence is even stronger when we consider that the time series for the 
volatility of equity and currency returns used in the analysis are rolled 
12-month-window moving averages, hence by construction slow in 
absorbing shocks. 
These results are consistent with the empirical findings of Haugen, 
Talmor, and Torous (1991). In the context of U.S. markets, they show 
that regime shifts in volatility, whether sudden or protracted over sev-
eral months, induce adjustments in the level of stock prices and realized 
returns. An intuitive explanation of this phenomenon is that any in-
formation shock that affects the volatility of a single market’s equity in-
dex returns, the volatility of the exchange rate, or the relation between 
the two eventually induces a shock in returns through the adjustment of 
the predicted component of the index volatility itself. Significant cross-
country correlations then channel the information shock that originates 
in a specific country into other markets. Market frictions, differences in 
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economic fundamentals, and constraints to hedging make the spillover 
phenomenon more or less pronounced.19 
The sequential nature of the estimated structural breaks appears to 
suggest that information spillover effects created return and volatil-
ity linkages among Asian markets. Information alters expectations in 
one market and affects returns and volatility in other markets through 
changes in hedging demand. The effect of these changes is protracted 
and delayed by the existence of market frictions. In Section V, we test 
more explicitly for cross-country information spillover and explore in 
greater detail the potential role of portfolio rebalancing and herding in 
the transmission of such volatility shocks across East Asia. 
D. Testing for Volatility Spillover 
A substantial issue remains unresolved: Does the observed sequence of 
structural breaks imply a causal relation from volatility to returns? In 
their study of the U.S. equity market, French et al. (1987) argue that 
larger-than-expected shocks to volatility may induce upward revisions 
of future volatility predictions, eventually increasing risk premiums. 
We extend the argument of French et al. (1987) to emerging markets, 
where the foreign investors’ component of the total investment is es-
pecially significant and the cash flows of export-oriented firms (which 
typically represent a relevant percentage of the local equity indexes) 
are affected by fluctuations in local currencies. Unexpected shocks to 
the volatility of the domestic market index might result from an un-
expected shock to the volatility of the local currency equity index, 
to the volatility of the exchange rate, or to the correlation between 
the two. For example, an increase in currency volatility makes the cash 
flows of export-oriented firms more uncertain. Higher equity volatility 
could instead raise the discount rates for those cash flows. Their com-
bined effect could induce an upward revision of both predicted cur-
rency and equity volatility, causing stock prices in local currency to 
decline and affecting returns in both domestic and foreign currencies. 
We study this dynamic interaction between returns and volatility 
using the timing information on the break events contained in table 3. 
The chronology of the structural breaks in volatility allows us to test for 
the existence of such information spillover by estimating the impact 
of the break event in country i at time t on the structural relation itself. 
We use the estimated break dates to test whether the chronologically se-
quential relation between volatility breaks and return breaks we found 
19. The available empirical evidence on the state of the economies involved in the Asian 
crisis (see Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 1996 and Corsetti et al. 1998) leads us to 
exclude the possibility that idiosyncratic shocks occurred in each of the countries for which 
the Wald statistic of eq. (4) is statistically significant; hence, that such shocks would explain 
the chronology of regime shifts in the posited reduced-form relations between equity and 
currency markets (in table 3). 
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TABLE 6 
Country 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Volatility versus Return Structural Breaks 
R2 
40.50% 
45.08% 
61.57%. 
44.76% 
25.66% 
34.13% 
Timing 
B 
BB 
A 
B 
A 
BB 
y 
-0.0370 
-0.0447a 
-0.0003 
0.1031 
-0.0163 
-0.0676 
Note.—This table displays the results of tests for the chronologically sequential relation between 
equity volatility breaks and equity return breaks in each country. We estimate the following regression: 
y, = \L -\- Ayt-1 + \ biXti-3 + d, (kj X + ayt-1 + ^ fS:-Xr+i-3 yd, (kV (8) 
where d, (ˆ VOL) is equal to one when t is higher than or equal to the lower bound of the confidence 
interval for the corresponding volatility structural break found in table 3 and zero otherwise. The first 
column of the table shows the regression adjusted R , Ra, for the structural relation (8) for each of the 
countries in the sample. The break dates k and AVOL have been identified with the Wald statistic de-
scribed in eq. (4) and are reported in Table 3, panels A and B, respectively. Here, y is the estimated 
coefficient for the volatility dummy. In the timing column, the table displays S if the volatility and 
return breaks are simultaneous, B if volatility breaks before returns, and A if volatility breaks after 
returns. Double letters represent a lead-lag of more than 1 year. To correct for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the residuals of the regression, the statistical significance of y is measured using 
Newey-West standard errors. 
Significant at the 10% level or less. 
in table 3 reflects a more-fundamental interaction between the two un-
derlying hypothesized structures of Section III. Therefore, we estimate 
the following regression: 
yt = |i -\-Ayt—1 + y biXt+i—3 ~\~ dAkJ 
i=1 
5 
\+ayt-1 + ^ (3;-Sf+i- + et + ydt (ˆ VOL) (8) 
Equation (8) tests whether the statistical power of eq. (1) for a 
country can be improved by including a dummy for the break in its 
relation between equity and currency return volatility. In the expres-
sion, dt ˆ kVOL) is equal to zero when t is below the lower limit of the 
confidence interval for the corresponding volatility break and one oth-
erwise. If volatility shocks were at least partially responsible for break 
events in returns, we would expect the estimated 7 values to be sta-
tistically significant. Moreover, if such shocks depressed returns, we 
would expect the estimated 7 values to be negative. Table 6 reports the 
results of the estimation of eq. (8). The statistical significance of 7 
is measured using Newey-West standard errors. We include all the 
countries in the experiment, although for some of them the registered 
volatility break occurred after the return event. This allows us to check 
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the robustness of our analysis. Indeed, when the interval between vol-
atility and return break dates is large and positive, we expect the esti-
mated g values to be insignificant. For example, in the case of Taiwan, 
where the structural relation between equity and currency volatility 
breaks almost 1 year after the corresponding return shift, the resulting g 
is not significantly different from zero. 
However, for most the countries in our sample, for which the break 
in volatility precedes the one in returns, the estimated g values are nega-
tive and, in many cases, significant. The exception is South Korea, 
where g is instead positive but statistically insignificant. That the evi-
dence of a causal relation from volatility to return breaks is weaker for 
South Korea has two, not necessarily conflicting, explanations. First, 
the confidence interval around the estimated volatility break date for 
South Korea (in table 3, panel B) encompasses the events that even-
tually led the country to abandon its defense of the won, as reported in 
table 1. Nonetheless, albeit significant at the 1% level, the Wald statistic 
corresponding to such regime shift in the reduced-form volatility rela-
tion of eq. (7) is the lowest (and, as is clear from figure 2C, the confi-
ˆ 
dence interval around k is the widest) among its East Asian peers, many 
of which were experiencing more extreme forms of economic and po-
litical turmoil at that time. Additionally, the Kospi 200 stock market 
index managed to recover during the first quarter of 1998, which is 
when a break in the linear relation between equity and currency returns 
is detected (March 1998, in table 3, panel B). This should not be 
surprising, given that the Korean economy was, and still is, among the 
most-developed, resilient, and dynamic of the region and given the 
massive bailout (U.S. $53 billion) the country received from the IMF in 
the fall of 1997 (see Bank for International Settlements 1999 and table 1). 
Hence, our evidence is consistent with the results of French et al. 
(1987) for the U.S. markets. Indeed, in our sample, past regime shifts in 
the linear relation between equity and currency return volatility appear 
to have induced a statistically and economically significant decline in 
equity returns, even after we controlled for the occurrence of a break in 
the relation between equity and currency returns of eq. (1). In partic-
ular, volatility shocks affected future returns for most of the Asian 
nations that experienced structural shifts in the posited relations be-
tween equity and currency markets during 1997 and 1998. 
E. Regime Shifts and Information Spillover across Countries 
The preceding analysis suggests not only that, during the events of1997 
and 1998, a negative relationship between volatility and returns char-
acterized many of the Asian countries under investigation but also that 
the observed sequence of breaks (in table 3) appeared to imply a causal 
link from volatility to returns. An intuitive explanation of this phenom-
enon is that any information shock that affects the volatility of a single 
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market’s equity returns, the volatility of the exchange rate, or the rela-
tion between the two may eventually induce a shock in returns through 
the adjustment of the predicted component of the index volatility itself. 
Significant cross-country correlations could channel those informa-
tion shocks from one country into other markets, with market frictions, 
differences in economic fundamentals, and constraints to hedging in-
fluencing the intensity of the spillover phenomenon. The sequential 
nature of those estimated structural breaks suggests that information 
spillover effects created return and volatility linkages between Asian 
markets. Information alters expectations in one market and affects re-
turns and volatility in other markets through changes in hedging de-
mand. The effect of these changes is protracted over time and delayed 
by the existence of market frictions. The existence of such linkages 
in East Asia has often been related to the availability of hedging and 
portfolio rebalancing opportunities among local equity markets around 
the time of the Asian turmoil. Indeed, Fleming et al. (1998), Kodres 
and Pritsker (2002), and Pasquariello (2002) contend that portfolio 
rebalancing represents a major channel for transmitting information 
shocks across markets. In the remainder of this paper, we address the 
closely related issues of whether the sequence of breaks reported in 
Table 3 implies a causal relationship across countries and whether 
cross-country spillover at or around the time of the Asian turmoil can 
be attributed to herding behavior by foreign investors. 
We use the timing information on the volatility break events con-
tained in table 3, panel B, to explain whether the observed sequence of 
structural breaks implies their transmission across countries. This ev-
idence suggests that breaks in volatility anticipated breaks in returns 
and volatility shocks affected future returns for most of the nations that 
experienced regime shifts in the posited relations between equity and 
currency markets during the crisis. The timing of the structural breaks 
in volatility allows us to test for the existence of information spillover 
by estimating the impact of the break event in country i at time t on the 
structural relation itself. From table 3, panel B, we identify two sets of 
countries that experienced a (quasi-) contemporaneous volatility break 
event. The first set consists of Thailand, Malaysia, and Taiwan in the 
fall of 1994. The second set comprises Indonesia, South Korea, and the 
Philippines in 1997-98. We then estimate the regression 
K 
o-yt = \i + A(jyt-1 + baxt + dt (k) [X + $axt] + 2> a^(ˆ') °>,< + £t- (9) 
Equation (9) tests whether the statistical power of eq. (7) can be im-
proved by including a dummy for break dates in the other countries in 
the group. Therefore, d\kj) is equal to zero when t is below the lower 
limit of the confidence interval for the volatility break registered in 
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T A B L E 7 Eva lua t ion of I n fo rma t ion Spi l lover : Volatility 
Country 
Contiguous Breaks Spillover Dummy 
R i = 1 i =2 tt1 a2 
Malaysia 9 6 . 6 3 % Thailand (S) Taiwan (S) 
Taiwan 82 .46% Malaysia (S) Thailand (S) 
Thailand 95 .82% Malaysia (S) Taiwan (S) 
Indonesia 9 2 . 4 5 % Philippines (D) South Korea (D) 
Philippines 9 2 . 1 1 % Indonesia (P) South Korea (P) 
South Korea 9 4 . 3 3 % Philippines (D) Indonesia (P) 
0.022 
-0 .036 
0.188 c 
0.042 
0.125 
0.003 
b 
-0.007 
0.057 
0.050 
0.262 
-0.021 
0.090 a 
b 
Note.—This table displays the results of tests for chronologically sequential relations between 
equity volatility breaks. From table 3, panel B, we identify two sets of countries that experienced a 
contemporaneous volatility break. The first set consists of Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand in mid-
1994. The second set comprises Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea in 1997–98. We then 
estimate the following regression: 
Oyt = [L + AOyt_1 + &(Txf + Jf (£j [X + |3(Txf OLjtff(&j) CT^f + £ f : (9) 
where tn -^J is equal to zero when t is earlier than the lower limit of the confidence interval for the 
volatility break registered in country i and one otherwise. The first column of the table shows the re-
gression adjusted R , Ra, for the structural relationship of eq. (9) for each of the countries in the sample. 
We identify the break dates k and k( through the Wald statistic described in eq. (4) ˆ  Break dates in our 
sample are collected in table 3, panel B. Country i is where a break contiguous to k has been recorded, 
according to the results reported in table 2. The Contiguous breaks columns display, for each country 
in the sample, the two markets where a contiguous break was recorded. We use S if the break is si-
multaneous, P if country i breaks before k, and D if country i breaks after k. The last three columns 
report the corresponding estimated coefficients for the information spillover dummies. To correct for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals of the regression, the statistical significance of 
the coefficients is measured using Newey-West standard errors. 
Significant at the 15% level. 
b 0 
Significant at the 1 % level. 
c 
Significant at the 5% level or less. 
country i and one otherwise. If information spillover were at least par-
tially responsible for the propagation of the event from one country 
to another, we would expect the estimated a values to be statistically 
significant. Table 7 reports the results of our analysis. Again, we eval-
uate the statistical significance of the coefficients using Newey-West 
standard errors. The clustering of volatility breaks in the fall of 1994 
does not seem to be characterized by information spillover. Indeed, all 
the coefficients for break events in other countries are statistically in-
distinguishable from zero, except for the parameter measuring the prop-
agation of a quasi-contemporaneous volatility shock from Malaysia 
to Thailand (a1 in table 7). The results for the second set of countries 
are strikingly different. Many of the coefficients for other countries’ 
volatility-adjusted break event dummies are significant at the 10% 
level or less, in particular suggesting spillover from Indonesia to the 
Philippines and (more weakly) South Korea. Therefore, the cross-
country propagation variables in table 6 appear to help explain the 
estimated sequence of volatility breaks occurring in Asia during 1997 
K 
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and 1998 and the ensuing statistically and economically significant de-
clines in equity returns. 
Prima facie, these findings seem to suggest that, after controlling for 
past regime shifts in the linear relation between their domestic equity 
and currency return volatility, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand in the 
fall of 1994 did not experience spillover of information from other 
markets in the region, while volatility shocks to Indonesia affected the 
Philippines and South Korea during the Asian crisis. However, the si-
multaneity of many of the spillover dummies prevents us from being 
able to distinguish between a rapid propagation of information in-
novations from one country to another and a common information 
shock, and this reduces the statistical power of the analysis of eq. (9). 
Moreover, such dummies do not explicitly account for one of the pos-
sible sources of spillover of information across countries, portfolio re-
balancing, nor do they distinguish it from the widespread withdrawal 
of foreign funds that would accompany a common information shock. 
Therefore, in the remainder of the paper, we concentrate on the analysis 
of flows of funds and explore more directly their relationship to the 
observed sequence of regime shifts between equity and currency mar-
kets across the Asian countries in our sample. 
V. Herding, Information Spillover, and Regime Shifts 
While there is general agreement that the Asian crisis was triggered by 
the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997, there is less agreement 
about the relative significance of the many factors that contributed to 
its severity. The long-term consequences of the Asian crisis, the role 
of foreign investment, and the manner in which the crisis propagated 
across the economies of Asia indeed remain hotly debated issues 
among academics and practitioners.20 However, the most frequently 
mentioned culprit for the crisis is the destabilizing effect of the flight 
of foreign capital from financially integrated markets. In particular, 
much popular press blames the ‘‘excessive speculation’’ and rapid 
withdrawal of capital by hedge funds for the events of 1997 and 1998. 
Although many studies suggest that portfolio rebalancing may have 
represented a major channel for transmitting information shocks across 
markets during the Asian crisis, the available empirical evidence re-
mains inconclusive. In the remainder of this paper, we attempt to clar-
ify some important aspects of the crisis through a formal analysis of 
the impact of flows of capital in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand on the relation between their equity 
and foreign exchange markets. 
20. Kallberg, Liu, and Pasquariello (2002) present an overview of the main explanations 
proposed by the economic and financial literature. For a further discussion of the causes of 
the Asian crisis, refer to Gangnes (1998) and Wu (1998). 
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A. Herding and Regime Shifts 
We start by investigating the herding behavior of foreign investors. 
Capital flight, in particular the widespread withdrawal of foreign funds 
from emerging equity markets, appears to have played an important 
role in the Asian crisis, especially in creating pressure on the domestic 
currencies and interest rates. Herding occurs when different markets 
simultaneously (or with only a slight lag) experience flows of foreign 
capital in the same direction. Herding intensifies the transmission of 
single-market information shocks through geographically or funda-
mentally heterogeneous markets. In our analysis, intercountry herding 
can arise because of distinct, yet related reasons, as in Wermers (1999). 
First, managers might mimic each other’s behavior, disregarding their 
private information, to avoid jeopardizing their reputation by trading 
differently from other managers, who are acting in apparently inter-
related markets. Second, managers might make country allocation de-
cisions simultaneously. This could happen either because the original 
information shock affecting a single market is correlated to the infor-
mation sets of the other markets or because a common information 
shock simultaneously affects all the information sets. Third, managers 
could infer private information from observing trading in geographi-
cally heterogeneous markets. Finally, institutional investors trading in 
different markets might need to rebalance their aggregate holdings in 
these markets as a result of global portfolio reallocation. 
To evaluate the extent to which international portfolio managers re-
allocated their wealth across the region, we use time series data on the 
net monthly flow of funds in each equity market. The flow is the differ-
ence (in millions of U.S. dollars) between total foreign purchases and 
sales of domestic equities in each month. Flow of funds data were col-
lected by local stock market authorities and made available to us by 
a major investment bank. Sample periods in most cases overlap the 
ones for equity and currency data and, again, all end in March 1999. 
Summary statistics for this data set are reported in table 2. Flows of 
funds show great variation across the sample, although the means are 
positive for each country.21 Figures 2c and 3c display our monthly flows 
21. A word of caution on the use of such data is necessary. The difference between total 
foreign purchases and sales of domestic equities in each month accounts only for the trading 
activity of foreign investors in the domestic spot equity markets. Speculative forces can 
nonetheless deeply affect financial markets even while inducing little or no change in those 
flows of funds. For example, our data set ignores the flow of loans from foreign banks to 
domestic borrowers that, as previously mentioned, characterized many East Asian econo-
mies during the early 1990s. Furthermore, if speculators choose to trade in derivatives (like 
swaps) to take a negative stance on a particular country, thus exercising a downward pres-
sure on the corresponding domestic markets, their actions would cause only marginal fluc-
tuations in the flows of funds to that country. Unfortunately, evidence on such activity is too 
scant, and often just anecdotal, to be employed in the statistical analysis that follows. We 
thank an anonymous referee for these observations. 
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of funds data for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand over two time intervals, March-December 1997 
and January-October 1998. These two intervals correspond to most 
of the observed break dates for equity versus currency returns (figures 
2a and 3 a) and equity versus currency return volatility (figures 2b and 
3b). 
The observed pattern in the flows of funds for 1997 (in figure 2c) 
is striking. Intense portfolio rebalancing activity occurred during the 
selected time period. While Malaysia suffered the most significant out-
flows, countries such as South Korea, the Philippines, and even Thailand 
experienced inflows of capital for most of that summer. These findings, 
coupled with the evidence that most of the volatility shocks accompa-
nying the Asian crisis (in table 3, panel B) occurred between August 
and October 1997, are consistent with information spillover effects. 
Portfolio rebalancing appears to be a major channel by which informa-
tion shocks were transmitted across markets during 1997. The picture 
for 1998 (figure 3c) is not as clear. Most of the countries in our sam-
ple experienced significant contemporaneous inflows and outflows of 
capital at that time, with Malaysia again acting as the bellwether. This 
is when our empirical model identifies structural breaks in the hy-
pothesized return relations. In this case, figure 3c seems to suggest that 
portfolio reallocation efforts affected the entire region during 1998, al-
though with a different intensity for each market, that is, herding may 
have been a driving force for the events of that year. 
To ascertain the statistical significance of these considerations, 
we use a measure of herding developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1992) and adopted by Wermers (1999). Choe, Kho, and Stulz 
(1999) employ a similar criterion to analyze herding behavior in the 
Korean stock market in 1997. The herding measure for a given month t, 
H(t), is defined as 
H(t) = \b(t) - E,_1[b(t)]\ -E{\b*(t)-E[b*(t)]\}, (10) 
where b(t) is the number of countries in which we observe negative flows 
of funds divided by the total number of countries for which flows of funds 
were available at time t. 
Equation (10) implies that either sign of H{t) is equally likely The 
proxy for Et-1 \b{fj\, the expected proportion ofoutflows during a given 
month, is the simple average of the observed b{t) during the past 
quarter. We calculate the adjustment term E{b*(t) — E[b*(t)]\} under 
the null hypothesis that herding is observed only as a result of ran-
dom chance. Hence, b*{t) is the proportion of negative flows that we 
would observe by drawing xt, the number of observed outflows at time 
t, from a binomial distribution B(xt,nt), where the probability of a 
single sell outcome is one half and nt is the number of countries in the 
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TABLE 8 Analysis of the Average Herding Measure, H{t), for Selected Periods 
Periods 
5/93–3/99 
5/93–12/95 
1/96–12/97 
1/98–3/99 
Mean H(t) 
6.55% 
6.99% 
2.05% 
12.89% 
Median H(t) 
6.25% 
6.25% 
- 4 . 5 1 % 
12.15% 
Std Dev H(i) 
19.07% 
19.85% 
13.95% 
23.56% 
^-Statistic 
2.83 
a 
1.90 
.72 
a 2.12 
NOTE.—This table displays the results of tests for the null hypothesis that herding is observed in 
selected time periods only by random chance; that is, the average herding measure H{t) developed by 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) has mean equal to zero across the six countries in our sample: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. We compute H{t) as 
H{t) = \b{t) -E,-1[b(t)]\ -E{\b*(t) -E[b*(t)]\}, (10) 
where b{t) is the number of countries in which we observe negative flows of funds over the total 
number of flows of funds available at time ?. Flows of funds are in millions of U.S. dollars and are 
calculated as the difference between the total foreign purchases and sales of domestic stocks in each 
month of the sample. The proxy for Et_1 \b(t)\ the expected proportion of sellers during a given 
month, is the simple average of the observed b{t) during the preceding quarter. The adjustment term 
E{\b* (t) — E[b* (?)]|} is calculated under the null hypothesis that herding is observed only as a result of 
random chance. Hence, b*(t) is the proportion of negative flows we would observe by drawing xf, the 
number of observed outflows at time ?, from a binomial distribution B{xt, nt), where the probability of a 
single sell outcome is one half and nt is the number of countries in the sample for which flows of funds 
data were available at time ?. Since xt follows a binomial distribution with probability b* (?) of success, 
E{\b* (t) — E[b* (?)]|} easily follows given b* (?) and nt. Our final measures of herding are generated as 
averages of H(t) over selected time intervals. 
Significant at the 10% level. 
b 
Significant at the 1% level or less. 
sample for which flows of funds data were available at time t. Since 
xt follows a binomial distribution with probability b*{t) of success, 
E{\b*{t) — E[b*{t)}\}, is then easily calculated given b*{t) and nt. Our 
final measures of herding are averages of H{t) over selected time 
intervals. 
When we analyze the herding measure for the chosen sample sub-
periods, we can test for systematic patterns in the aggregate behavior of 
fund managers who invest in the Far East. Any significant value of H{t) 
signals that international investors tend to trade in different markets 
together, at the same time, and in the same direction more often than 
would be expected by random and independent trading. 
Table 8 reports summary results on the herding measure H{t) for 
four time intervals. Over the longest time period, from May 1993 (when 
we have flows of funds for at least three countries) to March 1999, the 
figures are significant at the 1% level, indicating the presence of herd-
ing behavior. Breaking the time period into three subperiods shows 
that herding occurred primarily during 1998 and early 1999, when the 
^-statistic for H{t) is significant at the 10% level. In the interval sur-
rounding the Mexican peso crisis, between 1993 and the end of 1995, 
evidence of herding in our sample of Asian markets is weaker. In 1996 
and 1997, the herding measure is instead barely different from zero, as is 
the corresponding t-test. These results suggest that, consistent with the 
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analysis of figures 2 and 3, herding was strongest in 1998, the period 
during which most regime shifts in returns occurred. 
B. Herding and Clustering of Break Events 
One of the most puzzling characteristics of the financial crises of the 
past decade is the speed at which they appear to move from one country 
to the other, as the results of our investigation into how currency and 
equity markets interact during stress periods seem to confirm. As pre-
viously mentioned and as evident from the upper panels of figures 2 
and 3, breaks in the relation between currency and equity returns and 
return volatility are concentrated in relatively short periods of time, 
even after we account for the statistical uncertainty surrounding our 
estimates. Figures 2 and 3 and table 8 make it apparent that capital-flow 
reversals from international investors played a significant role in the 
clustering of estimated breaks in the reduced-form relations of eqq. (1) 
and (7) across Asian countries during 1997 and 1998. This should not 
be surprising, given the large holdings of emerging markets’ publicly 
available equity by international investors and the mounting evidence 
of institutional panic and herding around the time when the crises oc-
curred. Most significant for our paper, Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler 
(2001) observe that mutual fund investments were very responsive 
and volatile during most of the crises of the 1990s. In particular, they 
argue that the events of 1997 and 1998, although initiated in a single 
country (Thailand and Russia, respectively), rapidly propagated to other 
markets, due to the large and widespread withdrawals of funds from 
Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, thus providing support for 
cross-country spillover effects. In this section, we explore this issue in 
more depth. In the analysis we presented so far, breaks in the estimated 
relations between equity and currency return volatility cluster over a 
few months of 1997, when, however, the herding measure HðtÞ was 
barely different from zero. Breaks in the reduced-form relation be-
tween equity and currency returns were instead concentrated in 1998, 
when HðtÞ was instead large and significant. This evidence seems to 
suggest that herding played a role in the clustering of return breaks but 
less so in the clustering of volatility breaks. 
To translate this intuition into a more rigorous statistical inves-
tigation, we define some new variables. The first is It, the number of 
countries that at time t are experiencing a statistically significant break 
in their reduced-form relation between equity and currency markets; 
more specifically, It is the number of countries for which t falls in the 
corresponding break confidence interval, as specified in table 3. Hence, 
It measures the extent of the concentration of break events across 
the countries in our sample for each period t. We compute It for the 
sequences of both return breaks and return volatility breaks. In the re-
mainder of this section, we test whether herding explains the variability 
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of these series, which proxy for the clustering of volatility or return 
break events. 
To that end, we use the flows of funds data described in section II to 
derive a measure of the intensity of the herding behavior of interna-
tional investors at each point in time t. We define HM1t as the number of 
countries that at time t were experiencing a net outflow of funds from 
international investors. HM1t is a measure of signed herding, there-
fore focusing on the extent of net withdrawals across Asia at each point 
in time, which Kaminsky et al. (2001) already identified as a likely 
culprit in the events of 1997 and 1998. 
We test whether the herding proxy HM1t can explain the clustering of 
the break events reported in table 3. The easiest approach would be to 
use linear regressions. However, because the break is, by construction, 
a unique event and these events are concentrated over relatively few 
dates, the discrete variables It for returns and volatility are character-
ized by a preponderance of zeros and small values. Hence, such data 
appear to be better analyzed by a specification that accounts for those 
properties. In particular, the econometric literature suggests the use of 
the Poisson regression model. 
According to this approach, each variable It is assumed to be drawn 
from a Poisson distribution with parameter \ . The model is then 
Pr(/( = /) = i = 0,1,2,..., (11) 
where / is the number of countries experiencing a break event at time t. 
The variable X( is related to the signed herding regressor HM1t in terms of 
a log-linear model; that is, l n \ = B Rt, where B= [constant, [3] and 
Rt = [1,HM1t\. We estimate the model of eq. (11) by maximum likeli-
hood for the full sample Jan 1992-Mar 1999. Our parameter of interest is 
clearly (3. If estimates of (3 are positive and significant, then the expected 
number of break events per period E[It\HM1t] is bigger and the clustering 
of break events more likely when herding is more intense (i.e., when 
HM1t is higher). It is easy to show that the partial derivative of the con-
ditional expected number of break events per period E[It\HM1t\ with re-
spect to the corresponding herding measure is given by \t[i. In table 9, we 
report the results of the estimation of eq. (11) for It computed with respect 
to the breaks in the reduced-form eq. (7) for return volatility (listed in 
22. As previously mentioned, our data set covers net purchases (or sales) by foreign 
investors in the domestic spot equity markets for each of the six countries in our sample. 
However, although such data start on January 1992, both equity return and flows data are 
simultaneously available for all six countries only from March 1996. To accommodate these 
limitations, the variables It and HM1t are computed using only the subset of countries for 
which both flows of funds data and regime shift information were available at time t. 
23. For more on this topic, see Greene (1997), especially chapter 19. 
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TABLE 9 Herding and Spillover Effect: Poisson Model for Clustering of Breaks 
Volatility Breaks Return Breaks 
Statistics 
Constant 
(/-statistic) 
3 
(/-statistic) 
Pearson R2 
Deviance R2 
x2 (p-value) 
8E[I |HM]/8HM 
(f-statistic) 
HM1t 
-2 .0315 b 
(-5.516) 
.2544 
(1.948) 
-7.38% 
5.50% 
3.426a 
(.0642) 
.0526 
(1.248) 
HM2t 
-1 .4831 b 
(-2.657) 
.0289 
(-.081) 
.49% 
.05% 
.033 
(.8563) 
-.0060 
(-.180) 
HM1t 
-1 .8561 b 
(-5.649) 
.3043b 
(2.757) 
-16.17% 
5.89% 
6.803a 
(.0107) 
.0839 
(1.504) 
HM2t 
-7 .3703 b 
(-5.526) 
1.3438b 
(5.522) 
39.69% 
49.71% 
57.440 
(.0000) 
.3707 
(1.242) 
Note.—This table displays the results of the estimation of the Poisson regression model for the 
number of simultaneous break events in each period t , It , computed using the confidence intervals for 
breaks reported in table 3, panel B (for equity versus currency return volatility) and table 3, panel A 
(for equity versus currency returns). The probability of i such events in period t is given by 
Pr(/f = i) = : z = 0, 1, 2 , . . . (11) 
The variable \ t is formulated in terms of a log-linear model, i.e., ln\t = B Rt, where the coefficient 
vector B = [constant, [3]; HM1t and HM2 are the measures of signed and unsigned herding, respec-
tively, described in the text; and Rt = [1,HM1t] or Rt = [1,HM2t\. The model of eq. (11) is estimated 
via maximum likelihood. For each of the estimated coefficients (the constant and the herding parameter 
3) we report the corresponding ^-statistic. The two R statistics help assess the improvement of the fit 
resulting from using \ t instead of the mean value fory to predict It. The Pearson Rp is computed as 
Rp = 1 — [Sf(/f — \t) /\t]/[Et(It —/bar) /-4ar], where 1bar is the mean of It over the sample. The 
Deviance RD is instead obtained as RD = 1 [E^ln(/f/\f)]/[Ef/fln(./f/./bar)]. The goodness-of-fit statistics 
\ tests the hypothesis that the coefficients of the regression in eq. (11) are all zero. We also report the 
partial derivative of the conditional expected number of break events per period E[It\HM1t] with respect 
to the corresponding herding measure, HM1t This measure, given by Xf[3, is computed at the mean of 
HM1t. The clustering measure is computed using the six countries in our sample: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The model is estimated over the interval from 
January 1992 to March 1999. 
a 0 
Significant at the 1 % level. 
b 
Significant at the 1% level or less. 
table 3, panel B) and with respect to the breaks in the reduced-form eq. (1) 
for return (listed in table 3, panel A). 
The results from table 9 support our initial hypothesis that signed 
herding was a relevant factor in explaining the estimated clustering of 
return break events during 1998. In the third column of table 9, the 
coefficient (3 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% confidence 
level, as is the chi-squared statistic. Interestingly, signed herding ap-
pears to have played an important role in the clustering of volatility 
break events observed in 1994 (as hinted by table 3, panel B) and 1997 
as well. Indeed, the estimated coefficient (3 is again positive and sig-
nificant, although the evidence for the model’s fit is less compelling. 
We perform a parallel analysis using an alternative, more general 
measure of herding, HM2t, defined as the maximum of HM1t and the 
number of countries that at time t were experiencing a net inflow of 
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funds from international investors. HM2t is a proxy for unsigned herd-
ing, because it captures the extent to which international investors in 
different countries act together, independent of the direction of their 
flows. We estimate eq. (11) using HM2t for both return- and volatility-
based It Unsigned herding appears to explain the concentration of re-
gime shifts in returns but not the clustering of return volatility breaks 
during both the Mexican peso and the Asian crises. Indeed, the model 
for volatility (in the second column of table 9) is clearly rejected by the 
data. Nonetheless, unsigned herding significantly improves the fit of 
eq. (11) with respect to the clustering of return breaks, generating two 
different R2 values between 40% and 50%.24 Furthermore, using the 
estimates for b in the fourth column of table 9 to compute l t b over the 
mean values for Rt, we find that, on average, about one additional 
country suffers a regime shift in the reduced-form return relation of 
eq. (1) when the number of countries experiencing flows of funds of the 
same sign increases by 3 units.25 
To provide more intuition for these results, in figure 4, we plot the 
probabilities for various outcomes of the clustering variable It, for 
It ¼ 0; 1; 2, and 3, computed according to the following recursion: 
- 0 a ! Pr(/, = 0)=e-
P\ = Pr(/( = /) = I — \P\ / = 1, 2, 3. (12) 
The probabilities in eq. (12) are estimated using the coefficients 
from the first and third columns of table 9, for both the measures 
of volatility break clustering (figure 4a) and return break clustering 
(figure 4b), together with the corresponding dependent variable itself 
and the signed herding measure HM1t The correlation between those It 
values and HM1t is evident. As a consequence of the good fit provided 
by the model of eq. (11), the probability of no regime shifts drops, the 
expected number of countries suffering a break increases, and the clus-
tering probabilities P2 and P3 rise significantly when signed herding is 
more intense, that is, when the percentage of funds’ outflows across 
Asian equity markets is higher. 
In short, our analysis suggests that the likelihood of observing a 
concentration of regime shifts is an increasing function of signed herd-
ing, that is, widespread withdrawals from the corresponding equity mar-
kets; unsigned herding appears to be less successful in explaining the 
24. More precise definitions of the two different R2 values used to measure the fit of the 
log-linear model are in the note to table 9. 
25. In table 9, however, none of these measures is statistically significant, even though b 
is, because of the standard errors of the mean regressors. 
Fig. 4.—Probabilities of clustering of break events: Volatility and return. Figure 4 displays the time series of probabilities for the following 
outcomes of the clustering variable It = 0, 1,2, and 3, computed according to the recursion 
P't — 
Pr[ It —— 0 ) 
Pr(/, = i) \ i — 1, 2, 3, (12) 
for both the series of volatility breaks (figure 4a) and the series of breaks in returns (figure 4b), using the estimates for the constant term and 
the herding coefficient (3 for HM1t from table 9 and the log-linear model lnX^ = B'Rt where B = [constant, |3] and 7^ = [1, HM1t\. On the left 
axis, we plot (dark line) the number of simultaneous breaks It and (thin line) the explanatory variable HM1t, while on the right axis we plot P0, 
P1,P2, a n d P 3 . 
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clustering of return volatility breaks during 1994 and 1997. These find-
ings are consistent with our previous assertion that, as a result of herd-
ing behavior by international investors, the Asian financial markets 
experienced cross-country spillover during the crisis. 
VI. Conclusions 
Foreign exchange markets played a central role in the events that oc-
curred in Asia in 1997 and 1998. Our study investigates the structural 
relation between currency and equity markets in six Asian countries— 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand— 
around the time of the crisis. For each country, we specify reduced-
form linear relations between equity index returns and lead-and-lag 
currency returns. We chose the lead-and-lag specification to allow the 
data to determine whether and how one market anticipates or follows 
another. We adopted similar specifications to describe the structural 
relation between equity and currency return volatility. We applied the 
nonparametric statistical technique of Bai, Lumsdaine, and Stock 
(1998) to test for the existence of a single structural break in the posited 
relations between the time series of equity and currency returns and re-
turn volatility, respectively. We also computed confidence intervals for 
the estimated break dates for each country. 
We found that statistically and economically significant regime shifts 
in those relations did indeed take place in each of the countries in our 
data set over the sample period. The estimated regime shifts between 
equity and currency returns differ widely, both in timing and nature, 
from country to country. The shocks in the return relations appear to 
affect Malaysia and South Korea first, in early 1998, then move to the 
rest of Asia. Volatility breaks instead cluster during the Mexican peso 
crisis, in the fall of 1994, for Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand, and 
at the time of the first Asian currency crisis, in the last months of 1997, 
for the other countries in our sample. Our analysis shows that, for many 
of the countries in the sample, the corresponding domestic equity mar-
kets became more responsive to the volatility in currency markets after 
the regime breaks. 
We used the chronology of breaks implied by our analysis to dis-
tinguish whether market linkages among countries are due to common 
information shocks or information spillover effects. Most of the esti-
mated breaks in the hypothesized return and return volatility structural 
relations are not simultaneous, even when the uncertainty surround-
ing our estimates is taken into account. The sequential nature of these 
regime shifts indicates that information spillover effects created link-
ages across the Asian markets during 1997 and 1998. Information al-
ters expectations in one market and affects returns and volatility in 
other markets through changes in hedging demand. The effect of these 
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changes is protracted over time and delayed by the existence of market 
frictions. 
We examined the related issue of whether the negative relation be-
tween volatility and returns found by French et al. (1987) for the U.S. 
market holds for Asian markets. We found not only that there is a 
negative relationship between volatility and returns in the data but also 
that the breaks in volatility appear to have anticipated the breaks in 
returns. Moreover, the observed sequence of breaks appears to imply a 
causal relationship from volatility to returns. We in fact show that past 
volatility shocks negatively affected future returns for most of the 
nations that experienced regime shifts in the posited relations between 
equity and currency markets during the crisis. 
We further tested whether the estimated sequence of breaks implies 
a causal relationship across countries. Our analysis shows no evidence 
of information spillover for Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand in 1994, 
when they experience a simultaneous volatility break event. A com-
mon information shock seems a more likely explanation for the set of 
volatility breaks that occurred in those countries. We found instead some 
evidence of information spillover across Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
South Korea between 1997 and 1998. 
Many studies argue that herding behavior and the trading activity 
of international investors represent major channels for transmitting in-
formation shocks across markets. In that respect, our analysis sug-
gests that portfolio rebalancing played a crucial role during 1997 but 
not in 1998. We also found evidence of herding behavior over the 
entire sample period. The lowest degree of herding occured between 
1996 and 1997, when most of the breaks in volatility were observed; 
herding was particularly intense in 1998, around the time when most of 
the breaks in the posited reduced-form return relations were detected. 
Finally, using a Poisson regression model, we provide additional 
support for the hypothesis that the Asian markets were affected by 
cross-country spillover at or around the time of the crisis, by showing 
that the expected number of return and return volatility break events per 
period was bigger, and the clustering of those break events more likely, 
when signed herding was more intense, that is, when more equity 
markets were simultaneously experiencing funds’ withdrawals. 
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